Book review: Statue In Search of a Pedestal: A Biography of the Marquis de Lafayette
by Noel B. Gerson (1913-1988)
Dodd Meade & Company, New York,
1976
244 pages
I’m a first-time reader of
Lafayette biographies, so I’ll acknowledge that Gerson entertains by re-stating
the obvious: Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier de la Fayette was a
national, military, political and, indeed, a paternal hero to millions in
America and France during the American and (several) French revolutions.
There is no doubt that, despite the
fact that he was one of the richest French nobles of his time, he was publicly
and privately dedicated to republican government and a social/economic order
that was far more egalitarian than the monarchical and aristocratic structures
that prevailed.
Was Lafayette a great man? Gerson,
like many of his biographers, says yes. Lafayette was a courageous battlefield
leader, he was an enlightened manorial lord who enhanced the lives of his
peasants, and he was both outspoken and fearless, repeatedly, in literally
dangerous political situations for a couple decades in Revolutionary and
Napoleonic France. Gerson, like other Lafayette biographers, repeatedly attests
to these lifelong characteristics of the man Americans called “our Marquis.”
I feel obliged to call attention to
some countervailing factors that Gerson describes but does not
adequately
interpret.
Lafayette put his money where his
mouth was. He repeatedly used his great personal wealth to pay and outfit the
troops he commanded, when government funds and supplies ran low. I suggest a
case could be made that the Marquis, almost uniquely among American commanders,
paid for his military success in the Revolutionary War. Throughout the war, the
options and operations of colonial commanders were significantly hindered by
short funds and short supplies. If Lafayette had not been able to pay, feed,
clothe and arm his troops with his personal resources, could he have been as
winning a general as he was? I suspect the answer is “No.”
Some biographers refer to Lafayette
as the “victor” at Yorktown in 1781. Gerson says that Lafayette’s campaigning
in Virginia in the spring and summer of 1781 “was largely responsible for the
American victory at Yorktown.” Lafayette was not the only American general at
Yorktown, and he wasn’t the only French general; in fact, it was manifestly an
American and French victory at Yorktown. Lafayette did use his small force to
isolate Cornwallis in Yorktown, but he had to wait until Washington,
Rochambeau, de Grasse and others arrived with sufficient land and naval forces
before he participated in the final assaults.
In France he repeatedly declined to
step up to the plate and take executive leadership, during the revolutionary
and Napoleonic convulsions, when the French people and the contentious
military/political factions would have handed the throne or the presidency of
France to him on a velvet pillow. The Marquis repeatedly risked his life to
defuse explosive situations by his personal, courageous intervention. However,
Gerson fastidiously details Lafayette’s repeated reluctance to take the final
step and take control when, arguably, he could have stabilized dangerous
situations, and forestalled or prevented catastrophic consequences, by doing
so. Lafayette wasn’t responsible for the violence, but, time after time, he
left a void that was unfortunately filled by lesser men.
Was Lafayette a great man? Yes. A
successful general? Yes. Was he a really lucky guy? Yes. Did he and his
reputation benefit immensely from great wealth and fortuitous circumstance?
Yes. Did he live up to his potential in serving France and the French nation?
Maybe not.
For my taste, this is a breezy and
dispensable biography of Gilbert du Motier, marquis de la Fayette. Gerson was a
prolific writer (325 books during his lifetime). This one is not one of his well-remembered
works. It is a quick and easy read, especially if the absence of footnotes
doesn’t bother you.
Copyright © Richard Carl Subber 2014 All rights reserved.
